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Summary
The NATO allies discussed such issues as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans at
their summit in June 2004.  Improved capabilities were a theme touching on a range of
issues.  The summit occurred at a moment when there is discontent in the alliance over
the Bush Administration’s handling of Iraq.  This report may be updated.  See also CRS
Report RL32342, NATO and the European Union, by Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis.
Background
NATO held a summit in Istanbul, Turkey, June 28-29, 2004.  The Bush
Administration has emphasized such issues as developing new missions and capabilities
to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
However, Iraq’s future and Afghanistan dominated the meetings.  Some allies are critical
of U.S. leadership in Iraq.  Most allies believe that the stabilization of Afghanistan is the
alliance’s key task.  Other issues of note under discussion were new capabilities; NATO’s
role in the Balkans; and possible future enlargement of the alliance.
Iraq
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and subsequent efforts to stabilize that country
have caused great controversy in the alliance.  In February 2003, shortly before the war,
France, Germany, and Belgium attempted to block U.S. efforts to provide allied defensive
assistance to Turkey because they contended that such assistance would be tantamount
to acknowledgment that war was necessary and imminent.  The conflict and ensuing
failure to locate WMD sharpened a debate among the allies over the degree to which
international institutions, such as the U.N., should be relied upon for political measures,
such as inspections, before resorting to the use of force.
NATO’s current involvement in Iraq is minimal.  The alliance provides logistical and
communications assistance to Poland, which leads military stabilization efforts in part of
the country.  Sixteen of NATO’s 26 members provide forces to the U.S.-led Multinational
Force, but these forces, with the exception of those from Britain, Italy and Poland, are
small in number.
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Some U.S. officials had raised the possibility of a NATO mission in Iraq following
the transfer of sovereignty in June 2004.  Given the degree of allied resistance, however,
President Bush did not ask the allies to provide more troops in Iraq.  In response to a
request from the Iraqi interim government, NATO did agree to assist in training Iraq’s
security forces.  France and Germany opposed any effort to train the forces in Iraq; the
forces may be trained, therefore, on NATO member states’ territories.  The allies could
not agree upon a timetable for training.1
In allied countries, for the most part, public opinion opposes involvement of  national
forces in Iraq.  Polish officials have expressed a wish to have NATO take over Poland’s
sector by early 2005 in order to allow Warsaw to withdraw some of its forces.
Approximately 60% of the Polish people oppose their country’s involvement there.
Spanish forces, serving under Polish command, were withdrawn in May 2004 after a new
government took power.  In Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s public support has
plunged over his handling of Iraq issues.2
Several factors account for these reactions.  Some governments believe that the Bush
Administration went to war precipitously, without waiting for the results of U.N. weapons
inspections. They predicted that the move would diminish rather than enhance
international security.  The handling of prisoners by U.S. forces at the Abu Ghraib prison
in Iraq, in apparent violation of international conventions, has led to sharp criticism in the
European press and condemnation by some European governments.  The Administration’s
defense of some interrogation methods at Guantanamo and in Iraq has also elicited
criticism.  Some officials also state that they do not wish their government to take
measures that might be seen as assisting in the re-election of President Bush.3
Afghanistan4
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has said that the stabilization of
Afghanistan is NATO’s current primary mission. NATO’s International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) operates in Kabul and the province of Kunduz.  Its mission is to
bring stability to Afghanistan.  It is NATO’s first “out-of-area” mission beyond Europe,
and allied governments have described it as evidence of NATO’s determination to fight
terrorism.  ISAF draws approximately 6,500 troops from 31 countries; overwhelmingly,
however, the forces are from NATO’s 26 member states, above all from Germany,
Canada, Britain, France, and the Netherlands.  U.S. forces in ISAF are minimal.  
 A separate military operation in Afghanistan is “Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF),” not under NATO auspices.  This force numbers some 14,000 troops, largely U.S.,
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and is led by the United States.  The force is active primarily in the eastern part of the
country where it is attempting to eliminate Taliban and al Qaeda remnants.  France,
Norway, Italy, and several other allies are supplying special forces that work with U.S.
troops.  While some U.S. officials have raised the possibility of merging ISAF and the
OEF, the German government and possibly others do not wish to merge a stabilization
mission with a combat operation.
NATO has worked to extend ISAF’s reach in Afghanistan. Warlords are re-exerting
authority in parts of the country.  Afghanistan is to hold presidential and parliamentary
elections in September 2004 (postponed from June due to instability).  In concert with the
Afghan government,  NATO is attempting to establish Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs), composed of soldiers and civil affairs officers.  The objective of the PRTs is to
extend the reach of the central government, provide security, and undertake projects (such
as infrastructure development) that would  boost the Afghan economy.  
NATO had hoped to establish 5 PRTs by the Istanbul summit, and as many as 18 by
the end of 2004.  However, only one was established by the summit.  Secretary General
de Hoop Scheffer has been critical of allies that have promised to develop PRTs but that
have not supplied the forces and equipment pledged.  Some PRTs have only elements of
the necessary force in place.  A key element lacking is quick response combat and medical
units that could assist PRTs that find themselves in danger.5 NATO now hopes to
establish the 5 PRT’s by September 2004.  The future of the additional 13 PRT’s is in
doubt.  The alliance intends at least temporarily to increase the size of ISAF to 10,000 in
September in an effort to supply added stability for the elections.
Some Members of Congress who follow NATO closely are critical of allied efforts
in Afghanistan.  Representative Doug Bereuter has warned that the alliance faces a danger
of failure there. In June 2004, he said that NATO has never met a force goal in
Afghanistan.  He has asserted that there are 1100 infantry companies, 2,000 helicopters,
and 300 transport aircraft in European allied militaries, yet for Afghanistan the allies have
not provided the several infantry companies, helicopters, and transport aircraft necessary
to fulfil ISAF’s mission.  Mr. Bereuter has called the inability thus far to accomplish the
mission “a failure of political will, pure and simple” that “jeopardizes the very credibility
of the alliance.”6
Capabilities
The difficulties encountered in strengthening ISAF illustrate NATO’s deficiencies
in capabilities.  U.S. Marine General James Jones, now NATO’s SACEUR (Supreme
Allied Commander Europe), has repeatedly called on the allies to build forces that are
lighter and more “deployable,” a central theme of the NATO Prague summit in 2002.
During the Cold War, NATO built heavy forces meant to combat a Soviet threat in
Europe.  Now, with terrorism and proliferation the alliance’s principal concerns and out-
of-area responsibilities firmly established, the alliance is seeking to build forces that are
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light and mobile.  Today, only the United States, Britain, and France have combat forces
able to deploy long distances and sustain themselves for extended periods of time.
At Prague, the Bush Administration urged the allies to adopt two initiatives meant
to increase deployability.7 The Administration described the initiatives as a test to
revitalize the alliance.  One initiative, the NATO Response Force (NRF), is on schedule.
The allies wish to develop a force of 21,000 troops maintained in high-readiness status,
for high-intensity conflict, and able to reach its destination within 7-30 days of a NATO
decision to use it.  The NRF is an “insertion force,” designed to manage a conflict until
a larger allied force can arrive.  The force now has 6,500 troops, primarily European, and
is to be fully operational in 2006.
The other key initiative at the 2002 summit was the “Prague Capabilities
Commitment” (PCC).  The PCC succeeded an earlier capabilities initiative deemed to
have had too many unrealistic goals.  The PCC is a slimmed down version, with 8
capability goals targeting the allies’ principal deficiencies.  The capabilities include
strategic lift (air and sea), aerial refueling, precision-guided munitions, secure
communications, ground surveillance systems, and special forces.  At Istanbul, NATO
announced that a Chemical/Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear defense battalion has
become fully operational, fulfilling one of the capability goals.  However, there remain
serious shortfalls in aerial refuelers and in strategic lift, where PCC goals are unlikely to
be met on schedule.  Some governments, such as the German government, have pleaded
that competing budget necessities, such as pension programs, are forestalling plans to
modernize their militaries.  The German parliament has also reduced and capped defense
expenditures for the next several years.8
In the view of some observers, these shortfalls underscore the absence of political
will in some allied governments to meet force goals that were recently pledged.
Repercussions of these shortfalls include difficulty in meeting commitments already
made, such as sending forces to Afghanistan. The allies have identified Afghanistan as
their first priority; even if more European allies wished to send forces to Iraq, the ability
to deploy combat forces to assist in stabilizing that country would be lacking.  De Hoop
Scheffer has proposed that NATO discuss a possible reform in financing missions. NATO
has few jointly held combat assets. One such asset is the AWACs (an aerial early warning
and reconnaissance platform).  De Hoop Scheffer has proposed that, rather than pursue
the current practice of each country paying for its own forces deployed to a theater, NATO
purchase more joint assets that might be assigned by the alliance as a whole for an
operation.  Were this practice to be followed, then all allies contributing to the
development of equipment (and possibly units) would share in the cost.9
CRS-5
10 See CRS Report RS21774, Bosnia and International Security Forces: Transition from NATO
to the European Union in 2004, by Julie Kim; interviews with U.S. officials, May 2004.
11 CRS Report RL31053, Kosovo and U.S. Policy, by Julie Kim and Steven Woehrel; interviews
with U.S. officials, May 2004.
12 “Fine words on Arab democracy,” FT, June 11, 2004; and CRS Report RL32342, NATO and
the European Union, by Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, p. 8-10; CRS Report RL32407, The
(continued...)
The Balkans
NATO has had peacekeepers in Bosnia since 1995.  The initial Implementation Force
(IFOR) there numbered 60,000.  As Bosnia stabilized, NATO reduced the force,
ultimately called SFOR (Stabilization Force), to 7,000 troops (June 2004).  At the
summit, NATO announced that SFOR would end its mission by the end of 2004.  At that
point, the EU will deploy a military police force to provide stability.  NATO will retain
a small headquarters in Sarajevo, physically near an EU headquarters so that NATO and
the EU might work closely together.10  NATO will continue to assist in Bosnian defense
reform and will also continue the search for war criminals.
NATO also has a stabilization force, KFOR, in Kosovo.  Originally numbering
50,000 troops in 1999, KFOR now has a lower limit of 17,500, with no reductions in the
foreseeable future likely, given recent violence in Kosovo.  The U.S. contingent in KFOR
has been 15% or less of the entire force.  Some Pentagon officials reportedly sought to
reduce or end U.S. involvement in KFOR.  However, the Bush Administration has made
a decision that a U.S. commitment to KFOR demonstrates a U.S. desire to work with
European partners to bring stability to the Balkans.11
Membership and Partnership
The allies welcomed formally seven new members at the summit.  Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the alliance on March 29,
2004.  Most of these governments already participate in allied operations, including  in
ISAF and in the Balkans.  The allies stated that the door remains open to future members.
Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia are candidate states for membership.
Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina wish to join Partnership for Peace, but
the allies decided that too many hurdles remain before this step can be taken.  For
example, in both countries, succeeding governments have not delivered suspected war
criminals to the tribunal in The Hague.
At the summit, the allies did not endorse the Administration’s Broader Middle East
and North Africa Initiative. In winter 2004, the Administration had wished to adopt a
series of measures to promote democracy and human rights in a range of countries from
the western Sahara to Afghanistan; however, some allies and a number of Muslim states
have been reluctant to approve a program in which outside governments appeared to be
instructing Middle Eastern governments on steps to reform.  Some allies believe that the
United States and Europe will have minimal influence on the region unless the Arab-
Israeli conflict is first resolved.12 At Istanbul, the allies instead offered cooperation to
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some Middle Eastern countries through an “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,” which
includes programs in which NATO will assist these countries in defense and security
fields.
The allies wish to enhance their partnership with the Caucasus and Central Asia.  At
the summit, the allies discussed a  more energetic program of defense reform for these
states, which are in the Partnership for Peace program.
Conclusion
The war in Iraq and its aftermath have badly strained the alliance.  Some allies have
cast doubt on the Administration’s leadership.  Public opinion in most allied states is
sharply critical of the Bush Administration.  For example, shortly after September 11,
2001, the publics in Germany and France, respectively, had confidence in the United
States to deal responsibly with world affairs at levels of 73% and 53%; by May 2004,
those figures had dropped to 22% and 13%.13
Repercussions of tensions over Iraq continue to trouble the alliance. While most
allied governments believe that terrorism and proliferation are serious threats, they prefer
largely political measures to counter those threats.  They concede that military action may
occasionally be necessary, however.  At the same time, they note that it will be difficult
to persuade their populations to join with the United States in military operations in the
near future.  In part, some do not wish their forces to be associated with U.S. forces,
particularly in the Muslim world, in the wake of the scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison.
Some believe that a NATO operation in Iraq would taint the alliance, and could result in
a loss of credibility, should the operation fail.  Some also add that much has been lost in
Iraq in terms of the West’s claim that its value system provides a moral example to the
world.  In this view, the United States until recently had provided the core of those values,
and gave the world a worthy example of “the West’s” value system.  They believe that
these values must now be re-established, and that only judicious leadership from
Washington in Iraq and elsewhere can achieve this goal.14
